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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an empiricalinvestigation of the
effect of a preliminary breath test lawon drunk driving behavior.
A preliminary breath test lawreduces the procedural problems
associated with obtaining evidence ofdrunk driving and thus
increases the probability thata drunk driver will be arrested. In
1985, only 23 states had a preliminary breathtest law. According
to the theory of deterrence,increasing the probability of arrest
for drunk driving will reduce thefuture occurrence of this
behavior.The data set employed to test thetheory is a time
series from 1980 to 1985 ofcross sections of the 48 contiguous
states. Four highway mortality ratesare used as measures of drunk
driving. The effect of the breath test lawwas estimated using four
independent variable models and 12 dummy variablemodels. The four
independent variable models were also estimatedusing Learner's
specificationtest. Thepurpose of using these alternative
specifications and Learner's specification testwas to examine the
breath test coefficients forspecification bias. The econometric
resultsshow that the passage of a breath testlaw has a
significant deterrent effect on drunkdriving. Simulations with
these results suggest that if all stateshad a preliminary breath
test law, highway mortality could bereduced by about 2000 deaths
per year.
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Over the past few years, publicawareness of the social cost
of alcohol abuse has been increasing. Aparticular area of concern
is the number of alcohol related motorvehicle accidents. Highway
mortality is the third leading cause of death forpeople aged 35 to
54 and the leading cause of death forpeople under 35. The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimates thatalcohol is
involved in about 50 percent of these accidents.Because of these
statistics, the evaluation of deterrents to drunkdriving is an
important goal of policy research.
As a response to publicpressure, a number of states have
enacted legislation designed to reduce alcoholrelated traffic
deaths. Becker (1968) has shown that thedeterrent effect of
legislation can be described in terms ofexpected utility. This
approach assumes that an individual will commitan offense if its
expectedutilityexceedsthe expected utility derived from
alternative activities. While some drunkdriving is impulsive,
expected utility can be used to model drunk driving behaviorsince
the choice of drinking and then drivingis, a priori, a rational
decision. The expected utility approachimplies that the number of
offenses committed by an individual isnegatively related to the
cost of each offense. The cost of eachoffense is a positive
function of the probability of arrest andconviction and the
severity of punishment if convicted.2
The probability of arrest while driving drunk is verylow in
many states. Ross (1984) reportsthat this probability is generally
around one in a thousand. One reason this probabilityis so low is
the procedural difficulties the police encounterin obtaining
acceptable evidence of drunk driving. In manystateB, a suspected
drunk driver must be arrested before any tests forintoxication can
be performed. After the arrest the police must transportthe driver
to a testing station where a test of blood alcoholconcentration is
performed. This test can only beadministered by trained medical
personnel. Only the results of this test canbe used as evidence
of drunk driving.A second reason the arrest probability is very
low is because the police are reluctant toarrest drivers on
suspicionofdrunk driving. Foley (1986) reports that this
reluctance is due to the fact that most drinkingdrivers are
primarily middle class with more politicalties than the average
person who is arrested.
To reduce the problems associated with detectingdrunk
drivers, several states have recently enacted a preliminarybreath
test law. This law allows the police to administer abreath test
for blood alcohol concentration without first arrestingthe driver.
This test can be administered on the highway withoutthe assistance
of medicalpersonnel. Many states with preliminarybreath test laws
now also accept these test results, in placeof blood tests, as
evidence of drunk driving. Drivers who pass thebreath test are
free to go without further delay and without arecord of arrest.3
The preliminary breath test thus allowsthe police to screen more
drivers and increases the probability ofdetecting drunk drivers.
Many states have adopted various other lawsdesigned to
increase the probability of conviction andseverity of punishment.
To increase the probability ofconviction, most states have enacted
a per Be law. This law makes driving witha given blood alcohol
concentration conclusive evidence of drunkdriving. The per se law
results in the automatic conviction of driverswho fail the blood
alcohol concentration test. In 1985, 43 stateshad per se laws. All
but two of these states requireda blood alcohol concentration of
10 percent or more for automatic convictionof drunk driving. The
remainingtwostatesrequired .08percentblood alcohol
concentration for automatic conviction. Inaddition, many states
have increased the severity ofpunishment by adopting mandatory
sanctions. These sanctions include fines, licensesuspension or
revocation and imprisonment or community service.In 1985, 35
states had some type of mandatory sanction fora first conviction
on drunk driving.
The preliminary breath test law isparticularly important
since this law can have a greater impacton potential drunk drivers
than the per se law or mandatory sanctionlaws. The reason the
preliminary breath test affects more drivers thanper se laws is
that a .10percent blood alcohol concentration is required before
the per se laws have any application. Thepreliminary breath test
also can affect more drivers than themandatory sanction laws4
because blood alcohol concentrations under the per selevel are not
considered conclusive evidence of impairment. This allowsfor plea-
bargainingto a lesser charge to avoid mandatory sanctions.
According to the National Council on Alcoholism, ablood alcohol
concentration of .10percent represents consumption that is far in
excess of typical consumption.
1Therefore, the per se laws, and
because of plea—bargaining, the mandatory sanction laws,increase
the expected cost of drunk driving primarily forindividuals who
drink abnormal amounts of alcohol. The breath test, however,
because it increases the probability of detection, canresult in a
varietyoflesser charges imposed on individuals who would
otherwise have escaped detection.
The purpose of this paper is to test the effectthat the
preliminary breath test law has on drunk driving.The focus on the
breath test is important since it is an efficientmethod of
increasing the probability of arresting a drunkdriver. The number
of states which have this law has increased from 13in 1980 to 23
in 1985. However, nostudy has specifically examined the
effectiveness of the preliminary breath test in deterringdrunk
driving in the United States.
There have been a number of prior studies of drunk driving
deterrence policies. Ross provides an extensive reviewof this
literature. The British Road Safety Act of 1967 was oneof the more
important legislative initiatives since itserved as a model for5
several other counties. This Act Beta specific blood alcohol
concentration of .08 percent as the definitionof inebriation and
permitted the use of a preliminary breathtest. The Act did not
increase the severity of existingpenalties for drunk driving. Roes
reports that the police were restrained in theenforcement of the
new law and the courts required strict adherenceto the details of
the law which reduced the chance ofconviction. However, using
interrupted time series analysis, Rose concludesthat the Act did
have a deterrent effect on drunkdriving, at least for a few years.
Roes also reviews research on deterrencelegislation in
France,the Netherlands, Canada, New Zealandand Australia. He
finds that there have been seriousmethodological problems involved
intheevaluationofdeterrence laws in these countries.
Nevertheless, Rossconcludesthatthere is evidence of a
significant deterrence effect in these countries.The magnitude of
the deterrence effect, however, varies withthe public's perception
that these laws will be enforced.
II. Empirical Framework
Following Becker's work on deterrence, an empirical model is
derived fromatheoretical modelofconstrained utility
maximization. The arguments in the individual'sutility function
are drunk driving, other goods and taste. Thebudget constraint
includes income,the price of drunk driving and the price of other6
goods. The price of drunk driving isdetermined by the price of
alcohol, the expected costs of a driving accidentand the expected
penalties for drunk driving. The expectedcosts of a driving
accident are dependent on the probability of an accidentand the
direct and indirect costs of all damage borne by thedrunk driver.2
The expected penalties for drunk driving are dependent onthe
probabilities of arrest and conviction and thesanctions generally
imposed on convicted drunk drivers. This budgetconstraint is
nonlinear since the cost of drunk driving increaseswith the
quantity of drunk driving. Optimization ofthe utility function
results in a demand for drunk driving equation. The argumentsof
the demand function are the probability and expectedcost of a
highway accident, the probabilities of arrestand conviction, the
penalties for drunk driving and alcohol demandvariables. This
equationcanbeaggregated across individuals to yield an
empirically estimable demand for drunk driving equation.
Over the past few years a number of researchers have sought
empirical verification of Becker's deterrence hypothesis.These
studies often employ an aggregated cross section of annualdata.
Like all other econometric studies, these empirical deterrence
models must address problems with specification, measurementand
endogeneity.
Empirical deterrence studies whic.h have employedtime series
data and interrupted time series analysis have also encountered
methodological problems. The data used in these studiesoften7
consist of a few years of monthly observations.To insure that the
legislativechangeoccurred in a single time period it is
generallynecessary to limit the data to a single jurisdiction.4
The time series data used in a deterrencestudy should be extensive
enough to correctly identify trend,seasonality and random error.
Trends in drunk driving dataoccur as a result of gradually
shifting demographic patterns or as a result ofgradually changing
opinions about health and alcohol.Seasonality occurs in drunk
driving data due to the year—end holidays.Identifying random error
is difficult when the data is limitedto small jurisdictional
aggregates. An additional problem with interrupted timeseries
analysisisthe difficulty of separating the effectsof a
legislative change from other changes thatmay have occurred at
about the same time. These otherchanges include changes in gas
pricesandavailability,changes inalcoholprices and
availability, changes in insurance costs, new roadsor other
driving legislation.
In this study pooled cross section and timeseries data are
used in regressions of a measure ofdrunk driving on a set of
independent variables. The independent variables includea breath
test variable, highway conditionsvariables, alcohol availability
variables and a set of time dummies. The timedummies are included
to control time variation in thedependent variable. The advantage
of this specification is itsability to provide a separate estimate
ofthe effect on drunk driving of allincluded independent
variables. Breath test coefficients estimatedby this type of modela
canbe interpreted as measuring the effect of introducing abreath
test law holding constant other factors affectingdrunk driving and
any time trend in drunk driving.
Breath test coefficients from independent variablemodels of
this type should be tested for specification error.This iB
important because regression coefficients canbe sensitive to the
choice of independent variables included inthe specification.
Researchers have generally treated this problem by presentinga set
of alternative specifications of independentvariables. These sets
of regressions, however can only represent asmall subset all
possible relevant specifications.
Learner (1982) proposes an alternative method of treatingthe
specification problem. The independentvariables are divided into
necessary variables and doubtfulvariables. The necessary variables
must be included in any specification while thedoubtful variables
may be excluded. Learner's procedureuses the data matrix from a
specification which includes all doubtfulvariables and the data
matrix from a specification which constrains alldoubtful variables
to have coefficients equal to zero. These two matrices areweighted
by the inverse of their respective equationerror variances.
Varying the error variance from theconstrained equation will
generate a range of estimated coefficients.The degree of variation
in the necessary variable coefficients reveals theirrobustness.69
111. Data
The data used in this Studyconsist of state aggregates for
the 48 contiguous states for thetime period 1980 through 1985. The
mean value and summary definition ofeach variable is found in
table one.
Highway mortality accident ratesare the best empirical
measuresofdrunk driving available. While notall highway
mortality is the result of drunkdriving, there is a strong
correlation between the twomeasures. Several highway mortality
ratesareavailable. TheNationalHighway Traffic Safety
Administration estimates alcohol involvedhighway mortality rateB
based on statistical factors. Asan alternative to these estimated
rates, four age and time specificmortality rates are used as
dependent variables in this study.7 Thefirst mortality rate
includes all mortality regardlessof the age of the victims and
time of the accident and iscalled the total mortality rate. The
second mortality rate is limited todrivers who died between 12
a.m. and 4 a.m. and is called thenight driver mortality rate. The
National Highway Traffic Administrationestimates that 75 percent
to 90 percent of these drivershad been drinking. The third
mortality rate is limited to highwaymortality of 15 to 24 year
olds and is called the youthmortality rate. The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administrationestimates that the alcohol involved
accident rate for young drivers isthree times that of older
drivers. The last mortality rate islimited to drivers aged 15 to10
24, killed between 12 a.m. and 4 a.m.This mortality rate is called
the night driver youth mortalityrate. There are no estimates of
alcohol involvement for these drivers,but based on the other
estimates, it is likely that a large percentageof these drivers
had been drinking.
Each mortality rate is computed as motorvehicle deaths by
state divided by the relevant state population.Motor vehicle
mortality by state come from theFatal Accident Reporting System
and the data pertain to state of occurrencerather than state of
residence. The population data are from theCensus Bureau.
Since the mortality rate has a restricted range,a logistic
specification will conform to thedata more closely than a linear
specification. The logistic specificationis most easily achieved
by transforming the mortalityrate to ln(M/1—M), where N iB the
mortality rate and in is the naturallogarithm. Maddala (1983)
shows that weighted least squares should beused with this logistic
1/2
transformation.The weight is: (nM(1-M)1 ,wheren is the
a
populationof the state.
The preliminary breath test is a dichotomousvariable equal
tO one if a state has a preliminarybreath test law and is
otherwise equal to zero. The data comes fromthe National Highway
TrafficSafety Administration, the Departmentof Justice and
various compilations of state laws.11
Three measures are included in theregressions as empirical
proxies for the probability and cost ofa highway accident. They
are the number of vehicle miles traveled in100,000's of miles per
licensed driver, the number of licenseddrivers aged 24 years or
less as a fraction of all licenseddrivers, and the average vehicle
speed in miles per hour. Similar variables havebeen used in
interstate studies of the determinants of motorvehicle death rates
by Peltzman (1975) and Lave (1985). The numberof vehicle miles
traveled per driver reflects motor vehicleuse and highway density
and isexpected to have a positive regresBion coefficient.
According to Peltzman (1975), becauseyoung drivers have a higher
demand for risky driving, they aremore likely to have an accident
than older drivers. An increase in theper capita number of young
drivers should have a positive effecton the mortality rates. The
average vehicle speed should also have a positive effecton
mortalityratessince the probability of collision andthe
consequences of colli1on are positively related tospeed.
The number of licensed drivers of allages, the number of
licensed drivers aged 24 or less,average vehicle speed and the
number of vehicle miles traveledare published by the Federal
Highway Administration. TheFederalHighwayAdministration
estimates vehicle miles of travel from dataon gasoline consumption
and motor vehicle registration by state. Theaverage speed data are
derived from state certification reports.12
Real per capita personal income is alsoincluded in the
demand curve. This variable should be positivelyrelated to the
demand for beer, to the quality andcondition of motor vehicles,
and to safe driving practices. Thelast relationship emerges
because income and education are positivelyrelated and more
educated persons are likely to be saferdrivers. The predicted
effect of income on the mortality rateis thug, ambiguous. The
income data was published by the Bureauof Economic Analysis.
Another variable included in the demand curveis the state
unemployment rate. This variable may measurealcohol consumption or
driving. Unemployment may be a stressfactor increasing alcohol
consumption. Alternatively, unemployment mayreduce driving because
of reduced work related travel and reducedincome.
In the demand for drunk driving equationthe price of
alcohol is measured by the excise tax on beer.Excise tax data was
chosen to measure price since it is themost reliable price data
available.9 Because the tax data on various alcoholic beverages are
highly correlated, only one beveragetax can be used in the
regressions. Data on beer was chosensince beer is the the most
popular alcoholic beverage in theU.S.
The beer tax variable is defined as the sumof the Federal
and state excise tax rates on a case of 12 ouncecontainers of beer
dividedbythe annual national Consumer Price Index(CPI).
Deflation by the CPI is required to takeaccount of trends in13
prices of other goods between 1980 and 1985. Eachregression 18
estimated with time dummy variables to controltime trend in the
price data and time trend In the other variables. Thereal beer tax
is thus an accurate indicator of therelative price of beer
provided the non-tax component of the relativeprice is not state
dependent.
The Federal excise tax on a case of beerwas fixed in
nominal terms at 64 cents during the sampleperiod. State excise
tax rates were obtained from the U.S. BrewersAssociation (1985).
If a state raised its tax during theyear rather than on January 1,
its tax for the year is computed asa weighted average of the
higher and lower rates. The weights are the fraction of theyear
that each rate was in effect.
The legal drinking age variable is the minimumage for the
purchase of beer with alcohol content of 3. 2 percentor more. These
data come from Wagenaar (1.981/1982) and theDigest of State Alcohol
Related Legislation.
Three other alcohol variables are Included In the demand
curve. These variables are included as determinants of unobserved
exogenous alcohol sentiment. For example, anti—alcohol sentiment
should be relatively widespread in states in which thosereligious
groups that oppose the use of alcohol are prevalent. The first and
second of these variables are definedas the percentage of the
statepopulationwhoareMormonsandSouthern Baptists,14
respectively. The third variable measures other church membership
and is defined as the percentage of the state population who are
CatholicsandProtestants (excludingSouthern Baptists and
Mormons). These variables were available only for the years 1971
and1980. Estimates for 1981 through 1985 were computed by
logarithmic trend.
IV. Results
Theestimation results from the independent variable
specifications are presented in table two and the results for the
dummy variable specifications and the Learner test presented in
table three. Table two contains the estimation results from four
cross sectional models in columns one through four. These models
have different dependent variables but are otherwise identical. The
dependent variables are respectively: the total mortality rate, the
night driver mortality rate, the youth mortality rate, and the
night driver youth mortality rate. Table three contains only the
coefficientsofthepreliminary breath test. The dependent
variables used in table two are repeated in the same order in table
three. The coefficients reported in panels A, B and C of table
three are dummy variable models. These models use the breath test
variable with state and time dummies only. The Learner specification
test is reported in panel D of Table three. For convenience, the
breath test coefficients of table two are repeated in panel E of
table three.15
In table two, the coefficient of thepreliminary breath test
is negative and significant in all fourspecifications. Since the
functional form of each equation is logistic, andthe mortality
rate is very small, the breath test coefficientapproximately
equals the percentage differential between themortality rate in
states with the test compared to states withoutthe test, net of
all other factors. Table two shows that the breathtest law has a
larger effect on night driver mortality than on totalmortality.
This could be due to the higher level of alcoholinvolvement in
night driver mortality than in total mortality. The breathtest
coefficients in both youth mortality equationsare also larger than
the coefficient in the overall mortalityequation. This again is
probably due to the higher level of alcohol involvement inyouth
mortality than in total mortality.
The highway variables in the demand for drunkdriving
equation measure the probability and expectedseverity of highway
accidents. These variables are measures of totalvehicle miles
driven, the number of young drivers andaverage vehicle speed. Each
of these variables is positive and significant ineach regression
in table two.
The two income variables, real income andunemployment are
both negative and significant in eachspecification in table two.
Thenegativeincome coefficient suggests that higher income
individuals are safer drivers and operate vehiclesthat are in16
better physical condition. The negative unemploymentcoefficient
suggests that in areas with relatively highunemployment, people
drive less or do less drinking away from home.
The alcohol variables are included in the demandfor drunk
drivingequationasmeasures of alcohol consumption. These
variables are the real beer tax, the drinking ageand religious
sentiment variables. The real beer tax is negativeand significant
in all four specifications presented in table two.The magnitude of
the beer tax coefficient is larger in all three subgroupsthan in
theoverall mortality equation. Since alcohol involvementis
greater in these subgroups, the effect ofalcohol prices should be
larger. Saffer and Grossman (1987a, 1987b)estimate the effect of
beertaxesonyouthmortality rates.Their results are
approximately the same as the results reportedin table two. The
legaldrinkingageisnegative in each specification and
significant in the three subgroup specifications.The religious
sentiment variables are generally negative and significant.The
Mormon variable is negative and significant in all specifications.
The Southern Baptist variable is negative and significantonly in
theyouthmortalityregression.Finally, the other church
membershipvariableisnegativeandsignificantin each
specification except the night driver youth mortality regression.
10
The preliminary breath test coefficients for three dummy
variable models are presented in panels A, B and C of tablethree.
All preliminary breath test coefficients in these models are17
negative and significant. Panel A of this tablecontains the
results for models using the breath testand time dummies only.
These models are equivalent to those oftable two with the
exclusion of all independent variablesexcept the breath test. The
coefficients in panel A are approximately thesame as in panel E.
This indicates that no distortingcollinearity is introduced by the
inclusion of the independent variables.
Panel B of table three contains the resultsfor models
using the preliminary breath test, a set of 47 statedummies and
three time dummies. Any influences onmortality that were excluded
from the models in table two are controlledby the inclusion of the
state dummies. Three time dummieswere dropped because of the
11 collinearity introduced by the 47 state dummy variables. If the
time trend in the dependent variables is notcompletely controlled
when the three time dummies aredropped there will be an upward
bias in the breath test coefficients.However, the results reported
in panel B are again approximately thesame as those in panel E.
This suggests that the exclusion of relevantindependent variables
fromthe models reported in table two havenot biased the
preliminary breath test coefficients in any significantway.
Panel C of table three contains the resultsfor models
using the state dummies only. The coefficients of thepreliminary
breath test are clearly larger than in themodels which control
time trend.18
The results from the Learner procedure are presented in panel
D of table three. Learner suggests that the error variance from the
constrained equation be set at one fourth and four. As this error
varianceis increased, the computed breath test coefficients
approach the coefficients of the independent variable models.
The Learner procedure produces coefficient estimates which
are within the range delineated by panels E and C. This suggests
that any alternative subsets of the variables used in table two
would generate the same conclusions regarding the effects of the
breathtest.
V. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to estimate the effect a
preliminarybreath test law has drunk driving. Four different motor
vehicle mortality rates were used as measures of drunk driving. The
effect of the breath test was estimated using four independent
variable models and 12 dummy variable models. The four independent
variable models were also estimated using Learner's procedure. The
purpose of using these alternative specificationsand Learner's
procedure was to test the breath test coefficient for specification
bias. The econometric tests show that the passage of a breath test
law has a significant deterrent effect on drunk driving.19
The final empirical problem to beconsidered is estimation
of the number of lives that could havebeen saved if all states had
a preliminary breath test lawduring 1985. Since the mortality
equation is in logistic form, the log oddsratio, which would have
occurred in 1985 if all states hada breath test law, must be
estimated. Thie estimated ratio isequal to the actual 1985 log
odds ratio, plus the breath testcoefficient times one minus the
percent of states with a breath test law in 1985.The actual log
odds mortality rate in 1985was -8.60133. The the breath test
coefficient used for this calculation is theaverage of the breath
test coefficients from two totalmortality regressions. These
regressions are the state and timedummy regression reported in
panel B of table two and the independentvariable regression
reported in panel E of table three. The totalmortality regressions
were used because this is the most inclusivemortality rate. The
state and time dummy regression andthe independent variable
regressions were chosen because theseare the most inclusive
specifications. The average of these two breathtest coefficients
is -.0679. The value of one minusthe percent of states with a
breath test law in 1985 is .521. Theestimated log odds ratio of
mortality, if all states had a breath test lawis thus -8. 63832.
This is equal to totalmortality of 41,971. Since the actual
mortality in 1985 was 43,982, if all states hada breath test law,
mortality would have been reduced by 2011 deathB.20
Finally, while the breath test law has beenshown to reduce
drunk driving, many other anti-drunk drivinglaws have recently
been enacted. The most notable of these newlaws are the mandatory
sanctions for drunk driving. These sanctionsinclude mandatory
revocation and mandatory imprisonment. Analysisof the deterrent
effects of these new laws remains an important topicfor future
research.21
Table One
* Definitionsand Means of Variables
Variable Definition and Mean
Total Mortality Deaths in motor vehicle accidentsper Rate 100,000 population. Mean=19.718
Night Driver Driver deaths occurring between 12 A.M.and Mortality Rate 4 A.M., in motor vehicle accidents,per
100,000 population. Mean=2.562
Youth Mortality Deaths of 15 to 24 year aids in motor Rate
vehicle accidents per 100,000 population
aged 15 to 24. Mean=37.557
Youth Night Driver deaths of 15 to 24 year olds
Driver Mortality occurring between 12 A.M. and 4 A.M., Rate in motor vehicle accidents, per 100,000
population aged 15 to 24. Mean=6.927
Breath Test A dichotomous variable equal to one ifa
state has a law which authorizes the police
to administer a breath test, at a road
stop, prior to arrest. Mean=. 368
Vehicle Miles Vehicle miles traveled in hundred thousands
of miles per licensed driver. ?iean=.0jO
Young Drivers Number of licensed drivers aged 24 or less
as a fraction of all licensed drivers.
Mean=. 198
Average Speed Average vehicle speed in miles per hour.
Mean=55. 56
Real Income Money per capita personal income divided by
the Consumer Price Index (1967=1).
Mean=3947. 71
Unemployment Annual average state unemployment rate. Rate Mean=8. 167
Real Beer Tax Sum of federal and state excise taxes ona
24 unit case of 12 ounce contajoera of beer,
divided by the Consumer Price Index
(1967=1). Mean=.370
Drinking Age Minimum legal age in years for the purchase
and consumption of beer with an alcohol
content of more than 3.27.. Mean= 19.981
Mormon Fraction of the population who are Mormons.
Mean=1. 217
Southern Baptists Fraction of the population who are Southern
Baptists. Mean=7. 217
Other Church Fraction of the population who are Catholics Member or Protestant (excluding Mormons and
Southern Baptists. Mean4l.395
*








Breath Test -.0681 -.0922 -.0981 -.0761
(2.99) (3.19) 4.18) (2.48)
Vehicle Miles 13.4128 24.7097 20. 1114 30.5290
(1.91) (2.77) (2.77) (3.20)
Young Drivers 1.9454 3. 0293 1.7813 2. 6042
(3.80) (4.76) (3.38) (3.88)
Average Speed .0307 .0357 .0198 .0249
(4.21) (3.83) (2.64) (2.51)
Real Income -.0003 -.0002 -.0003 -.0002
(8.75) (4.61) (9.42) (4.70)
Unemployment Rate -.0482 -.0315 -.0545 -.0421
(7.59) (3.96) (8.35) (4.96)
Real Beer Tax -.2393 -.3466 -.3208 -.3450
(3.19) (3.55) (4.12) (3.31)
Drinking Age -.0155 -.0297 -.0238 -.0432
(1.64) (2.54) (2.45) (3.48)
Mormon -.0104 -.0115 -.0111 -.0121
(5.04) (3.92) (5.17) (3.72)
Southern Baptist -.0019 .0001 -.0050 -.0027
(1.00) (.01) (2.61) (1.03)
Other Church Member -.0116 -.0036 -.0096 -.0018
(11.18) (2.82) (8.88) (1.28)
R-Squared .70 .55 .63 .46
*Eachequation includes an intercept andfive time dummy variables
and the t-values are in parentheses.23
Table Three
* BreathTest Coefficients




Time Dummies -.0975 -.1134 -.1023 -.0654 (2.96) (3.67) (3.36) (2.08)
Panel B:
State and -.0676 -.1488 -.0669 -.0988 Time Dummies (2.26) (2.81) (1.95) (1.72)
Panel C:
State Dummies -.1211 -.2267 -.1214 -.1671 (3.49) (3.97) (3.13) (2.77)
Panel D:
Learner TeBt -.1286 -.1932 -.1544 -.1713 -.0814 -.1159 -.1134 -.1008
Panel E:
Independent -.0681 -.0922 -.0981 -.0761 Variable Model (2.99) (3.19) (4.16) (2.48)
*The t-valueeare in parentheses. The firstrow of panel D contains the coefficientsestmatecf when a i=.25 and the second row contains the estimates when a24
FOOTNOTES
* Wewish to thank Michael Grossman for his helpfulcomments.
1) Steam(1986) reports that to reach a blood alcoholconcentration
of .10percent, a 150 pound person with an emptystomach would have to
consume five drinks of 80 proof liquorin one hour.
2) All the costs of drunk driving maynot be borne by the drunk
driver. Sanctions against drunk driving are amethod of internalizing
the expected or actual externalitiescreated by drunk driving.
3> Learner (1983) provides an exampleof the consequences of these
specification problems in estimationof the deterrence effect of
capital punishment.
4) See McPheters et a!. (1984) for an exampleof this type of study.
5) The estimation equation is:
b =(2 +-2(Z'Z))1 -2
b =akxl vector consisting of k1 necessaryvariable coefficients
fllowed by k2
doubtful variable coefficients, 2
=theerror variance from the constrained equation,and a =
theerror variance from the unconstrainedequation,
3 =akxk identity matrix with the first k1 diagonalelements
changed to zero,
Z =annxk data matrix consisting of k1 necessaryvariables
followed by k2 doubtful variables,
Y =annxl vector of values of the dpendent variable.
Learner suggests values of .25 and 4 for s
6)Endogeneity of the breath test maybe a problem. However,
endogeneitymay be viewed as anomitted variable problem. The
specification tests show that thebreath test coefficients are not
significantly affected by omitted variablebias.
7) Actual mortality data is preferableto estimated data because
the estimated data contains an errorwhich may bias the regression
coefficients.
8) The weight for the difference specificationis:
(1/n) (1/N1 ( 1—N1) +1/M0( 1—N0)]
where N1 is the mortality rate in the latter yearand N0
is the mortality rate in the earlier year.
9) The excise tax on beer is a preferred measureof price. Assume that
the price of beer, exclusive of tax,varies among states because the
supply curve slopes upward. Underthis assumption, an increase in the
demand for beer will simultaneously raisethe price of beer, the
quantity of beer consumed and the mortalityrate. This would result in
a biased price coefficient in thedemand regression.25
10) No consistent datasources could be found for thesample period to measure mandatory sanctions fordrunk driving. These datawould be desirable since estimates ofthe effects of these lawsare of interest. The specificationtests show that omittedvariable bias due to omitted mandatorysanctions or due to omittedaverage sanctions is not significant.
11) The Belsley, Kuh andWelsch collirlearity test foundthe time dummies for 1980, 1981 and1985 with the highestCondition index. Therefore, instead of the usualcase of dropping a singledummy, all three dummies were dropped fromthe models using the 47 statedummies.26
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